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A real-time computer may fail because of (i) massive component failures or (ii) not
responding quickly enough to satisfy real-time requirements. An increase in redundancy
-- a conventional means of improving re liability -- can improve the former but can -- in
some cases -- degrade the latter consit trably due to the overhead associated with redun
Clancy management, namely the time delay resulting from synchronization and
voting/inicractive consistency techniques,
In this paper, we consider the implications of synchronization and
voting/interactive consistency algorithms in N-modular clusters on reliability. Ali these
Audies have been carried out in the context of real-time applications. As a demonstra-
tive example, we have analyzed results from experiments conducted at the NASA Airlab,
on the Software Implemented Fault-Tolerance (SIFT) computer. This analysis has
indeed indicated that. in most real-time applications, it is better to employ hardware syn-
chronization instead of software synchronization, and not allow reconfiguratiou.
Subject Index: Synchronization, Communication (1)
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rt	 1. INTRODUCTION
The use of digital computers, particularly multiprocessors, has become common-
!/
place in such real-time applications as aircraft control, nuclear reactor control, power
distribution and monitoring, automated manufacturing, etc. Such computers are typi-
J 
cally required to have very high reliability. (For example, the benchmark figure used at
NASA is 10-s probability of failure over a 10-hour flight period for an aircraft control
computer). Unlike their conventional counterparts, the failure probability of real-time
systems is not completely characterized by the probability of massive hardware failure	 1
alone : failure can also occur due to excessively long response times. In other words,
there are /lard deadlines for code execution that, if missed, can lead to catastrophic
	
^j
consequences. The probability of dynamic failure, pdp, introduced in [1) and further	 .t
refined in (5), integrates the two causes of failure and expresses their probability of
occurrence, pdy„ over some pre-defined operating period is defined as the probability that
the system will miss at least one hard deadline during this period.
As a solution to the reliability problem in real-time computers, N-Modular Redun-
dancy (NMR) has been widely used. In such cases, a task is executed in parallel by N
modules, and it is necessary to reach agreement even in the presence of faults among
some of these N modules. The traditional method to do this is by votiag. However, such
approaches are not guaranteed to work when it is required to unambiguously locate a
fault as well as to detect the consequent error. Indeed, simplistic analyses (e.g. [18,191)
are negated by the possibility that a malfunctioning device will act maliciously or disrup-
tively. A faulty device can do this by reporting different values to different receivers, i,e.
by lying. For this purpose Byzantine Generals (also known as it-,eractive consistency )
approaches [2-4) have been suggested. However, such algorithms have very high over-
ti
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Leads, and there are cases where Byzantine General algorithms actually make a mul-
tiprocessor more liable to failure by adding redundancy beyond a certain threshold.
That is, by adding redundancy it is possible to introduce too much overhead to meet the
p,ty„ requirement. There is therefore the need to examine carefully the implications of
various methods for handling NMR systems. In this paper, we critically compare several
approaches in the context of real-time applications.
The block diagram in Figure I shows a typical real-time system from an functional
point of view. Sensor input is treated by means of voting or interactive consistency
methods to ensure fault-tolerance, before being made available for execution by the
NMR cluster. Once execution is complete, voting or interactive consistency checks have
again to be performed. With that done, the output data can be passed on to the
actuator(s) or the displays. Throughout, synchrony must be maintained amongst the
processors that make up the NMR cluster.
Rceponee time is defined as the delay between the triggering of a job by the arrival
of the relevant sensor input to the actuator/display output that finally results. The
overall response time is the sum of the time for reaching agreement on the sensor data,
the execution time itself,,and the time for synchronization and reaching agreement on
the results generated by the processors in the NMR cluster before the data are fed to the
relevant actuators. Of these times, only the execution time is independent of the cluster
size, N.
In this paper, we present the results of a study of the delay overheads imposed by
voting/ interactive consistency and synchronization methods and quantify their impact
on computer reliability expressed through the probability of dynamic failure. This is the
probability that, over a certain given period of operation, either (a) the processor cluster
7
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has failed to the point that fault-masking no longer works, or (b) the hard deadline has
been violated although (a) has not occurred. In particular, we shall contrast the reliabili.
ties offered by reconfigurable and non-reconfigurable systems. It will turn out in some
cases, contrary to intuition, that non-reconfigurable systems are the more reliable type.
This poper is organized as follows. In the next section, we consider synchronization
and the delay it imposes. In doing so, we present a theorem that enables the design of an
arbitrarily large phase-locked, fault-tolerant clock. We show that software synchroniza-
tion techniques are excessively time-consuming, and indeed impose a limit on the size of
a cluster that can be thus syuchronized. In Section 3, the fault-masking techniques of
voting and interactive consistency are considered, and their delay overheads estimated.
In Section 4, we use the results of Section 3 to compare the reliabilities of reconfigurable
and non-reconfigurable systems, operating in real-time, under the constraints of a hard
deadline. We conclude with Section 5 which identifies a number of interesting unsolved
problems.
2. SYNCBRONIZA.TION
When a multiplicity of processors executes code in parallel, care must be taken to
keep them reasonably in step. Therefore, the issue of synchronization is focal to all
methods of forward error recovery. There are two basic methods of synchronization:
(1). Each processor has an ultra-precise clock. When the computer is switched on, the
clocks are synchronized. If the clocks are sufficiently precise, the processors will
continue to run in lock-step for an appreciable period. Unfortunately, such highly
precise clocks are extremely expensive, and unsuited to incorporation in computer
circuits. (For a description of highly precise clocks, see [7]). Clocks used in com-
puter circuits drift too rapidly for this method to be employed in practice. We shall
4
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not consider this method any further.
(2). The synchronization is carried out mutually. There is no single component whose
functioning is critical to the security of the whole system. One may choose to syn-
chronize either the individual processor clocks or the processors at prc-defined
boundaries of software execution. In the first case, one has a system operating
more or less in lock-step, such as the FTMP system 18]. Both methods of synchroni-
zation are based on the same basic concepts; the only difference is the frequency
with which synchronization is carried out 2 The notion of virtunT'time sources now
arises naturally. These are not necessarily clocks in the traditional sense; they mark
the points at• which an individual processor performs synchronization. It is con-
venient to view them as virtual clocks, whose transitions represent either clock
"ticks" or execution of a stretch of code up to a pre-specified boundary. In the
sequel, unless it is otherwise stated, the term "clock" is used to mean "virtual
clock".
When synchronization is mutual, no "absolute" underlying time-source exists, only
a set of time-sources whose relative behavior must be kept in step. The synchronizer
(which may or may not be physically part of the processor and which may be imple-
mented either in hardware or in software) must therefore in each case have a perception
of the state of the other time-sources. This perception may or may not be identical to
that of the other synchronizers: if faulty modules necessarily behave consistently with
respect to all synchronizers, it is identical; otherwise it need not be so.
2 An important corollary of this is that the maximum clock drift rates permitted in the synchronization
at boundaries of a large stretch of code are smaller.
5
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The synchronization process contributes to the system overhead in two ways.
Firstly, there is the overhead imposed by the synchronization task itself. Secondly, the
task-to-task communication overhead is proportional to the degree of synchronization
achieved, If hardware synchronization with phase-locked clocks is employed, the syn-
chronization overhead can be reduced to vanishing point. If software synchronization is
used, the overhead is significant. Both approaches to synchronization will be considered
in succeeding sections. First, however, we consider the impact on the communication
overhead.
Because of severe timing constraints, real-time systems do not generally use sophis-
ticated mechanisms for task-to-task communication. Typically, data are transmitted
from one task to another via timing rules agreed in advance. As a result, the receiving
task has to wait for a time equal to the sum of the maximum transmission time and the
maximum possible clock skew before it can read the data. For example, in the SIFT sys-
tem, a wait loop has to be added when the r.ormal dispatching overhead is less than the
maximum clock skew. Such a wait naturally degrades performance, and all the more so
since execution is supposed to be carried out in real-time. Where synchronization is car-
ried out in software and depends on the transmission of timing data on regular data
channels, this transmission delay feeds back to increase the synchronization delay itself.
We will consider this matter in detail in Section 2.2.
2.1. Hardware Synchronization
Probably the best way of keeping clocks synchronized in the presence of malicious
failures is to lock them in phase. For an introduction, see [12], and for a careful analysis,
see [14).
9
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The philosophy behind the operation of plisse-locked clocks is simple. See Figure 2.
Given Nclocks to be synchronized in the face of up to m faulty clocks, the arrangement
consists of a receiver which monitors the clock pulses of the N-1 other clocks in the
arrangement, and uses them as a reference. This reference is treated as a measur e of the
phase error by the receiving clock. The estimated phase error is then put into an
appropriate filter, and the output of the filter is used to control the clock oscillator's fre-
quency. By appropriately controlling the frequency of the individual clocks, they can be
kept in phase-lock and therefore in synchrony.
For the arrangement to work properly, the phase error should be below some criti-
cal value. The magnitude of this value depends to a large extent on the nature of the
filter. A brief discussion of clock stability is provided in [12]. The arrangement for
N=A, m=1, is particularly simple and is, to our knowledge, the only phase-locked clock
constructed. Here, the reference used is the second incoming pulse (in temporal order),
i.e, the median pulse. Such a clock is proof against the malice of a single faulty clock.
Unfortunately, when one attempts to increase Nor in without sufficient care, syn-
chrony can be lost through malicious behavior and the consequent formation of a multi- 	 I
plicity of cliques, i.e. self-sustaining groups of clocks maintaining synchrony within their
individual cliques, but out of synchrony with the other non-faulty clocks in the cluster.
By definition, there must be one and only one clique to which all non-faulty clocks
belong. In this section, we show how phase-locked clocks may be safely expanded to
tolerate any given number of malicious clocks. In particular, we seek to determine N as a
function of m, and also the voting strategy.
A simple voting strategy is defined by an integer AM, which means that the
AN)—th incoming signal (in temporal order) is taken as the reference value against which
7
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the receiving clock compares its own value. Our task is so to obtain N and AN) that
there is, in the face of up to m malicious clocks, exactly one clique in the whole system
to which every non-faulty clock belongs.
To begin with, note that as long as synchrony is maintained, every non-faulty
clock must belong to exactly one clique, while a maliciously faulty clock may belong to
any number of cliques. Using this requirement, we can obtain the following useful
theorem.
	
Theorem 1: Let N and m be the cluster size and the maximum number of faulty 	 i
members tolerable in the system, respectively, then (i) N > 3m and (ii) nth is the smal-
lest integer strictly greater than 2 (N+m) - 1.
Proof: For convenience, define the size of any clique as the number of non-faulty clocks
in it. Then, the minimum possible size of a clique is AM-m+1. There are at least N-m
non-faulty devices. The requirement that there be exactly one clique of non-faulty dev-
ices then yields:3
N-m	 1	 (1)L AM-m+1 —
Also, since the AM-th incoming signal must either be a signal from a non-faulty clock or
from a fauity clock that is sandwiched between the signals of two non-faulty clocks, we
have AM < N-m-1. From (1) we get AM > 2 (N+m) - 1, thereby leading to an ine-
I	 ^
quality for RN):
° It is easy to show that if this expression is satisfied, there will be exactly one clique when the number
of maliciously malfunctioning clocks is less than m.
1
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2 (N+m)-1 < AN) <_ N-in	 (2)
This inequality implies N> 3rn. We may therefore define AM to be the smallest
integer strictly greater than 2 ( N+m) — 1 where N > 3m. Q.E.D.
With this arrangement, the possibility of forming multiple cliques vanishes, and tite sys-
teat remains in synchrony as long as the individual non-faulty clocks have sufficiently
low drift rates and are sufficiently well synchronized at start-up to maintain phase-lock.
As an illustration of the above theorem, consider the following example.
Example: This example is meant to illustrate why N > 3tn in a phase-locked clock.
Case 1: First, consider the case N=O, rn=2, and simple majority voting is used. Label
the clocks A, B, C, D, E, and P respectively. Let E and F be maliciously faulty clocks.
We present here a scenario in which cliques {A,B,E,P) and (C,D,E,I• ) are formed, thus
destroying synchrony between, for example, B and C.
Let G(") denote the moment in "absolute time"' at which clock a for
a=A,B,C,D,E,P puts out its i—th tick. Since even non-faulty clocks drift, these
moments will very likely be mutually different. Define the a-scenario, S O) as the ordering
of the clock values as seen by clock a in the r—lh clock cycle. In the sequel, we suppress
the superscript for convenience. Denote the reference clock by bold-face notation. The
following scenarios are possible for, say, the i— th clock cycle:
S A = C,t<CE<CF<CB<Cp<Co
I While it might seem a contradiction to invoke real or absolute time when we said that it has no
meaning in mutual synchronization, it is not so. The only role "absolute time" has to play here is in defining
a mutual ordering of the respective clock ticks.
i
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Sp= CB< CP< C A < CB< CD< CC
S C = CA<CQ<CD<CC<CP<CP
SD = CA< CD< CD<C C< CB< CP
and the scenarios S E and Sp are of no relo-Vince since G and r are faulty clocks. Note
that the mutual order of the non-faulty clocks is preserved for all four scenarios, while
that including the faulty clocks is not necessarily preserved.
It is easy now to see that this scenario can perpetuate itself and that the sets (A,B)
and (C,D) will then diverge, forming cliques {A,B,C,P} and {C,D,G,P}, et.ch of size two.
Phase-locking is no protection against this because of the malicious behavior of faulty
clocks G and P. Therefore, N=6 is not large enough to tolerate up to m=2 faults.
Case 2: Now consider N=7, m=2, and AM-4, with non-faulty clocks A,B,C,D, and C,
and faulty clocks G and P. We show that multiple cliques cannot form by systematically
eliminating all possibilities. Consider all possible 2-clique arrangements: {1,4}, and {2,3}
where the numbers denote the size of the candidate clique. It is easy to see that a clique	 l
of size one is not self-sustaining since even with the two faulty clocks thrown in, there
would only be two signals into the receiver circuit, which is less than AM. The {2,3}
arrangement can similarly be disposed off: while the clique of size 3 is self-sustaining,
that with size 2 is not. So, there is no two-clique arrangement that can be sustained. It is
easy to see that three-, four- and five-clique arrangements are also impossible. So,
N=7, m=2, and AM=4 has at most one clique.
Remark 1: A pathological curiosity
While the system is in phase-lock, it is possible for only z=AM-rn+1 non-faulty
processors to cause the whole system to drift monotonically in frequency. This can only
I
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happen, however, when z of the processors have a consistent drift in one direction.
Theoretically, the whole system could be dragged down to zero frequency or up to a very
high frequency, keeping perfect synchrony as it gets there. Since the drift of good cry-
stal -locks is only some few parts per million and the frequencies over which they can
range is• limited, this difficulty is no more.than academic. It does, however, serve to
emphasize that phase-locked clocks do not necessarily average out drifts.
Remark 2: Synchronization overhead
In the case of a phase-locked clock, there is some time overhead clue to the oscilla.
tions that are possible as a result of malicious behavior. However, these are minimal
when good crystal clocks are used, and so it is reasonable to treat the overhead of
r
hardware synchronization as negligible. Also, the clock skew is very small/ negligible in a
well-designed phase-locked clock.
Remark 3: An alternative design
The only other hardware arrangement that we are aware of for keeping synchrony
1
in the face of malicious behavior is the multi-stage synchronizer arrangement proposed
by Davies and Wakerly (6(. The idea is shown in Figure 3. It consists of nt stages of N
synchronizers each. The system works on the principle that with this redundancy, there
must be at least one level of synchronizers that assures proper synchronization in the
presence of malicious faults. An informal proof is provided in (6(.
This arrangement results in a proliferation of hardware. As readily be verified, the
total number of devices (processors and synchronizers) in the cluster is 2m 2+3m+1. The
total number of 1/0 ports required is given by 8m3+10rn2+10m+2. The potential enor-
ti
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mity of the above numbers should be driven home by the consideration that in order to
maximize returns fronA redundancy, the individual modules must be isolated from one
another as much as possible. This dictates that power supplies must also be replicated
in large numbers, and that the benefits of large-scale integration cannot be brought to
bear on the issue: individual synchronizers must be on separate devices -- even, perhaps,
on separate cards. Otherwise, correlated and common-cause failures could wipe out relia.
bility gains made by device redundancy.
Compared with the gargantuan redundancy required by the Davies and Wakerly
approach, the PJ=3m-i•1 requirement of phase locked clocks represents an extremely
elegant hardware solution to the problem of synchronization in the presence of malicious
faults.
2.2. Software Synchronization
The use of decentralized algorithms for synchronization offers an alternative to the
hardware methods described above. Such algorithms enable a system consisting of many
processors with their own clocks to operate in close synchrony. The degree of synchroni-
zation obtained by these algorithms depends primarily on the performance of the com•,
munications system, the precision of the clocks, and the frequency of resynchronization.
The task-to-task communications system's one-way message time is at least B+5 where
B is the maximum transmission time and h is the maximum clock skew, The most
time-efficient of the software synchronization algorithms that we know of is the interac-
live convergence algorithm (9].
In the interactive convergence algorithm, each processor in the system determines
its skew relative to every other processor in the system. If any relative skew is greater
12
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than a predetermined threshold, it is set to zero. An average of all the relative skews is
calculated and used to correct its clock.
The following theorem (a trivial adaptation of one proved in [01) characterizes tl:e
maximum clock skew of the system in terms of the system parameters defined below:
t - maximum error in reading another processor's clock
p - maximum drift rate between any two clocks in the system
N - number of clocks in the system.
m - maximum number of faulty clocks accommodated,
R - resynchronization period.
S(N) - execution time of the resynchronization task for an NMR cluster.
6s - maximum clock skew at start-up.
The. vern 2: Let the following conditions hold:
3m<N
6 > [1— 3m_ 2p(1• m ))-i[2E{I+n(1— "` )} + p ( R + 2 Nm ,^N))1N	 N	 N	 N
6>be+pR
max(b, S(N)) < R
p6«E
I
Then, the non-faulty clocks remain in synchrony, i.e, the maximum skew is 6.
The synchronization algorithm is run periodically, the major component of the exe-
cution time usually being the time required to read every other processor's clock in the
system. In the SIFT system, each processor's clock value is broadcast during a window
of time allocated to it. There are N such windows, one for each processor in the system.
13
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All other processors wait during this window to receive the broadcast data value.
In order to accommodate the worst -case situation, each window must be at least
B+b long. The interactive convergence algorithm takes an execution time equal to
S(N)=N(B+6)+K, where K is the time needed to compute and carry out the clock
correction.
It should be noted that this execution time of the synchronization task affects the
synchronization process itself. Indeed, since this is a function of N, there is a maximum
cluster size that, can be synchronized in this way. To see this, substitute the above
expression for S(N) in the formula for 6, and obtain:
6 > N(N-3m-2p(N'+N-rnN-m))-' (2c+p{R+2(N-m)(B+ N)}^ 	 (31
From this, one can (a) compute the minimum execution time of the synchronization task
as a function of the cluster size, (b) obtain the quality of synchronization (the smaller
the 6, the better the synchronization), and (c) determine the largest possible cluster that
can be thus synchronized: this is the largest N for which S(N) < R.
The values for the SIFT system are given by B=18.2 micro-seconds, and execution
time for the synchronization task is 1.760 milli-seconds. PIumerical results on the syn-
chronization overhead using these values are plotted in Figure 4. The curves in Fir-ire 4
show the dependence of the synchronization overhead on the maximum drift rate, p. The
maximum cluster size permissible for synchronization is tabulated in Table 1.
Although the expression S(N) = N(6+B)+K was presented as emanating from the
SIFT system, it is easy to see that in any system where communication is by broadcast,
and clock transmission slots are pre-determined, this expression will hold. It should also
be reiterated that such communication protocols are the most commonly used protocols
14
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in real-time, systems. In any case, it is obvious that whatever the protocol used, S(N) is
very unlikely to be less than a first order function of N.
Even if, in a hypothetical case, S(N) were negligible (which, of course can never
happen but nevertheless represents an extreme case), b will continue to be a function of
N, and there will be a point for which b>R, at which synchrony will break down.
3. VOTING AND BYZANTINE GENERALS ALGORITHM
A complete analysis of real-time systems must take into account both the processor
synchronization overhead and the overhead associated with voting/interactive cou-
sistency techniques used for input and output functions. The former has been carefully
examined in the previous section. We now discuss the latter in detail.
3.1. Voting
Once the delay involved in synchronization is taken account of, there is very little
additional delay if the voting is carried out in hardware. With software voting, however,
the additional overhead can be significant.
Voting in software is carried out by individual processors placing data to be voted
on in pre-specified "mailboxes" or "pigeonholes". The voter searches the mailboxes for
valid data, fetches them, and then votes on them. The execution time in the retrieval
step is directly proportional to the number of processors in the cluster, N. The execution
time required to vote N values and diagnose up to m faults is known to be at least
(N-1)C, + C2 but less than [(N-1) + 2m — 21 C, + Cs = [ 5(3 1) —21 C, + C. where
C, C2 are some constants (see (13) for this).
Experimental data exist for 3-MR and 5-MR in SIFT. These data can easily be
introduced into the linear model obtained above. If s is the number of data values 	
ti
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voted, and, Vda) the time taken for an N-way vote on a data values, the following
Depression was found to hold for SIFT:
VA(a) = 58.5 a N t 120.5 (q)
where the time unit is micro-seconds. This is a large overhead: in SIFT, voting is per-
formed at the beginning of a 3.2 milli-second subframe. If a=6, N=5, then 78% of the
subframe is consumed by the voting algorithm 1161.
3.2. Byzantine Generals Algorithms
The Byzantine Generals, or interactive consistency, algorithm must be used when it
is needed to isolate the sources of errors as well as to mask the errors themselves. It finds
use when reconfiguration upon failure is to be attempted and the executive is distri-
buted. The algorithm takes into account the fact that faulty processors may be mali-
cious, in other words, that they need not fail only in "safe" directions. To be absolutely
certain that faulty processors can be properly identified for isolation, it is necessary to
allow for every possible misbehavior. Thus the case when a faulty processor is malicious
-- that it actively and intelligently attempts to hide its malfunction -- must also be han-
dled. Such algorithms are typically used to reach agreement between processors in a clus-
ter on incoming sensor data, and in certain clock synchronization algorithms. For
further details, see [2-4].
The input of data is accomplished by every processor reading the external sources
independently or by one processor reading the external sources and then distributing the
obtained value to the rest of the processors. In the first case, each processor would very
probably get a different value -- even if they were in perfect synchrony -- due to the
inherent instability in reading analog data. Hence, a subsequent, exchange of values read
along with a mid-value selection is required to get a consistent value. However, this
y
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process suffers from sensitivity to malicious faulty processors and interactive consistency
(or Byzantine Generals) algorithms are essential where fault isolation and reconfiguration
are required.
The interactive consistency algorithm consists of the following steps:
(1) 1,ic source value is distributed to the N processors,
(2) The received values are exchanged m times to handle up to in faulty processors.
(3) A consistent value is obtained by use of a recursive algorithm. When m=1, this
reduces to a majority calculation.
N must be at least 3m+1. The overhead for these interactive consistency algorithms
can be considerable. The number of messages required to obtain interactive consistency
is of the order of N"-'. To give an idea of the actual numbers incurred in practice, some
experiments on the SIFT computer were run.
In SIFT, with five-way voting, only one fault can be located. The simple flight-
control applications currently running in SIFT use 63 external sensor values, each of
which goes through the interactive consistency algorithm. From the data collected, exe-
cution times for steps (1) and (2) of the algorithm can be estimated, and a lower bound
determined for step (3). The following data were measured: step (1) : 3.05 ma, step (2)
: 2.22 ma, and step (3) : 6.57 ma (total 11.84 ma). For larger m, the step (1) execution
time should not change significantly, while the step (3) calculation would require at least
6.57 ma (very likely much more). The step (2) process consists of only message exchanges
and thus varies directly with the number of messages which are sent. The following for-
mula represents an approximate execution time for step (2) as a function of m:
2.22 NM" ma). We may add the timing values for steps (1) and steps (3) above to this
expression to obtain a lower bound for the overhead of the Byzantine Generals algorithm
November 14, 1083
in SIFT. Since the interactive consistency tasks must be executed at the data sample
rate, a large portion of the available CPU time is consumed, In Table 2 we present the
interactive consistency overhead in SIFT. It indicates that the percentage overhead
drastically increases as (i) the number of faults to be tolerated increases, or (ii) the major
frame (i.e. data sampling period) decreases.
It should be pointed out that there have lately been some more efficient implemen-
cations of the Byzantine Generals algorithm (18) than have been implemented on SIFT,
However, even such implementations exhibit high overheads as the number of faulty
modules to be accommodated increases.
4. RECONFIGUR_ABLE AND NON-RECONFIGURABLE SYSTEMS
In some cases, it is possible through encryption, to defeat malicious failures, thus
making interactive consistency algorithms unnecessary for locating faults. Unfor-
tunately, we know of no estimate of the probability of occurrence of malicious faults
that cannot be so defeated. In the absence of any such data, we must for safety, allow
all fault , to be so malicious that encryption cannot defeat them. This means that recon-
figurable systems in ultra-reliable applications must use the interactive consistency algo-
rithms to isolate faulty units.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, this algorithm is extremely time-consuming to run.
R.eronfigurable systems must therefore contend with a large overhead as compared to
non-reconfigurable systems.
However, reconfigurable systems have the advantage of dynamic redundancy
management. When widespread failures occur, it is possible to retire some clusters in
order to keep others at full strength. Also, by periodically purging itself of faulty com-
ponents, a reconfigurable system can survive in the face of more failures than can a
1s
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{	 non-reconfigurable system. For example, if one started operation with a 7-cluster, the
` I reconfigurable system would not fail unless either (a) all but two processors fail, or (b)
more than rn (m=2 for a 7-cluster, and 1 for a 4-cluster) processors fail between succes-
sive tests, while the corresponding non-reconfigurable system would fail if more than 3
processors failed. This does not mean that a reconfigurable system is necessarily better
than a non-reconfigurable one, since as we shall see, timing requirements impose severe
constraints on the size of reconfigurable clusters.
We shall contrast the reliability of reconfigurable and non-reconfigurable systems
j
with the following example. Assume that there is a single critical task in the system that
requires 3.2 milli-seconds to run, and that this task is dispatched every 100 milli-
	 ! '1
seconds 5 The hard deadline is violated when a task is not completed before its successor
is dispatched. There is a total of N processors available. Processors fail according to an
exponential law with specified MTBF. The mission lifetime (duration between successive
service stages) is also specified.
Remark 4: It is usual in analyses of multiprocessors to assume that the service time is
exponentially distributed. This works well for general-purpose systems where it
represents a certain lack of information about the job mix, and where the long tail of the
exponential distribution does not seriously affect computations since these are generally
based on mean-value ay alysis and do involve hard deadlines. Real-time software, how-
ever, is written a^cording to strict timing requirements, and one must have a good idea
about the maximum execution time. One may choose to regard this maximum time as
the actual execution time in all instances for purposes of safety. The value of 3.2 milli-
seconds that we adopt here is the length of a single subframe in the SIFT system.
s 3.2 and 100 milli-seconds represent, respectively, the length of a subframe and frame in the SIFT sys-
tem.	 Y
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In the following sections, we consider non-reconfigurable and reconfigurable systems
separately. In both cases, we assume that synchronization is by means of phase-locked
(physical, not virtual) clocks. Since these can be made arbitrarily reliable and are com-
mon to both reconfigurable and non-reconfigurablc systems, we do not consider the pro-
bability of clock failure in what follows. Numerical results in the section on reconfigur-
able systems are based on the lower bounds obtained from SIFT.
4.1. Non-Reconfigurable System
	
Under the above assumptions, the probability of dynamic failure is simply equal to
	 J
	
the probability of static failure, i.e. the probability that fewer than ( 2 i processors fail
	 ? t
over the mission lifetime. This probability for a number of mission lifetimes is graphed in
Figure 6. i
4.2. Reconfigurable System
Since, in a reconfigurable system, an execution of the Byzantine Generals Algorithm
must take place both at the input and the output, we have the time overhead bounded
1
	
below by 4.44N 1°
-1 +19.24 milli-seconds (N > 3m). Since the task execution time is 3.2	
I
i
milli-seconds, an unreplenishable reserve of 100 -3.2=96.8 milli-seconds of time is avail-
able. If the overhead is smaller than this, the probability of dynamic failure is equal to
i
the probability of static failure, if not, it is equal to unity.
As may readily be seen, for clusters with m>2, the overhead exceeds the reserve of
time, so that the maximum allowed size of the cluster is N-7, m=2. For this reason, if
we start with more than 7 processors, the excess processors will have to be on stand-by
for inclusion upon a failure within the cluster. Failure occurs if either during a single
20
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execution more than m failures occur in the cluster, or if the processor pool is exhausted,
i.e. if there is an insufficient number of processors left to make up a cluster.
The reconfiguration policy is simple. The system begins operation with either a 7-
MR or a 4-MR cluster (depending on the value of N). As processors fail, they are
replaced if spares are available. If the stock of spares is exhausted, further failures are
handled by the 7-M11 cluster reconfiguring into a 4-MR cluster (when the system began
operation with a 7-MR cluster). If N < 7, only a single failure can be tolerated. It is
thus a combination of hybrid and adaptive voting [171.
The analysis for the dynamic failure probability is straightforward, and differs from
previous analyses on reconfigurable NMR 118,101 in that the probability of more than m
failures over an execution cycle is taken into account here. We assume that the failure
rate of the stand-by processors is the same as that of functioning processors.
Numerical results for the probability of dynamic failure of reconfigurable systems
are plotted in Figure 5 for a ready comparison with their non-reconfigurable counter-
parts.
It is apparent from Figure 5 that while increasing the number of available proces-
sors in a non-reconfigurablo system -reduces its probability of dynamic failure, there is a
lower bound to the probability of dynamic failure for reconfigurable systems. This bound
is caused by the fact that the cluster eize is limited to 7, since the overhead exceeds
100% for larger clusters. There is therefore a point after which the probability of more
than m processor failures over a single execution (aggregated over the mission lifetime)
becomes the dominant component in, the probability of dynamic failure. As one might
expect, the reconfigurable system performs better than the non-reconfigurable system
when the mission lifetime is longer. This has been at the horrible price, in this case, of a
21
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50,3% overhead,
Clearly, the results in Figure 5 are problem-specific, indeed, they are critically
dependent on the length of the inter-dispatch interval, the unreplenishable reserve of
time that is available, and the time taken to execute the Byzantine algorithm. Also,
while the reconfigurable system may appear to be the better performer in Figure 5, this
is largely due to the large reserve of time available. Suppose that the task, instead of
taking a maximum of 3.2 milli-seconds to perform, took 70 milli-seconds. Then, the
reserve of time is 100-70=30 milli-seconds, and the largest reconfigurable cluster that
could fit in this reserve is N=4, ra=1. In Figure 0, we display results for such a task,
Naturally, the reconfigurable system comes out much more poorly here.
In place of running the Byzantine Generals Algorithm every time the task is
dispatched, one might consider running it only when execution of a vote detected a fault.
While this would reduce the expected overhead, the worst-case overhead would still be
the same. For this reason, while such a scheme might reduce the expected critical task
execution time, and allow more (non-critical) tasks to be run, the maximum number of
critical tasks possible is not increased,
However, if one were interested in expected response time as a secondary attribute
of system performance, this scheme is worth exploring. In particular, such a scheme
would reduce the mean cost as defined in [1].
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered various methods of synchronization and fault-
masking in redundant systems, with a view to using them in real-time applications.
We have presented a theorem that makes it possible to design fault-tolerant phase-
locked clocks of arbitrary size, thus making hardware synchronization of arbitrarily large
22
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clusters possible; quantified the overheads due to software synchronization, showing that
these impose a large overhead, and that they break down beyond a certain cluster size.
We have presented experimental results obtained from the SIFT computer on the over-
heads connected with software synchronization, software voting and interactive con-
sistency algorithms. Finally, we have contrasted the reliabilitics of reconfigurable and
non-reconfigurable systems, under conditions of hard deadlines and unreplenishable
reserves of time, and shown that there are conditions under which the large overliead
connected with reconfigurable systems actually reduce their reliability below that of
their non-reconfigurable counter-parts.
A number of interesting and important questions remain open. We list a few of
them below.
(i) How can one definitively estimate or measure the probability that a processor fault
will act maliciously?
(ii) What effect will various coding algorithms have on the probability of malicious
failure?
(iii) The quantity 3rn-hl occurs repeatedly for the minimum number of elements in a
cluster that must maintain either synchrony or interactive consistency in the face
of up to m malicious failures: in this paper, we have added phase-locked clocks to
this family of structures. This would seem to be caused by some underlying com-
mon features or principle. As of this writing it is unknown, as to whether or not
this is so, and if it is, what the underlying principle is. The answer to this questiou
would very considerably add to our understanding of the behavior of distributed
systems.
23
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Tito results and indications presented in this paper are useful in the quest for
appropriate modeling and analysis of real-time systems. Real-time systems have too
often been treated as an unimportant appendage of general multiprocessing. It is impor-
tant to recognize that real-time systems form a separate discipline of their own, and to
develop tools for their development. The work outlined in this paper forms part of such
an effort.
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Maximum Cluster Sizetin ate
-0EiDrif '13-0 40-0 X10
2 224X 10-4 •10
b X 10'0 37
1 X 10-" 34
6 X 10 22
1 X 10-5 16
+* Applies to SIFT.
Table 1. Maximum Cluster Size
ple Period m=1 m=2 m=3
0 ms 11.8% 25.1 % >380 %
0 ms
q26
23.7 % 50	 o >760%
36.0 % 70.2 0 > 11.100
 ms 47: f % > 100 0 > 1520%
m = number or faulty processors accommodated
Table 2, Interactive Consistency Overhead in SIFT.
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Figure 4. Overhead of Interactive Convergence Algorithm
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